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petition. The goal here is not economic welfare, but the improvement of
broadcasting service,83 to which increased competition between networks is
not relevant.84
CHANGE OF BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE DURING
THE LIFE OF A COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
UNDER THE WAGNER ACT
MOST deep-rooted in importance of the problems emerging under the
Wagner Act' are those created by a shift in employees' union allegiance after
execution of a contract with their employer. When such a shift occurs, the
initial issue before the NLRB involves its power in the face of one union's
contract to certify another as bargaining representative of the workers. On
the one hand, the statute contains no exception to the Board's administrative
duty to investigate and certify when a question as to employee representation
arises.2 On the other, traditional legal doctrine, left intact by the statute,
83. It is estimated that 82% of the families in the United States have radios, and
that 82.9% of all radio families listen sometime everyday. See JoIxr ConnrTra O
RADIo R ES.ARc, STUDY OF RuRAL RADIO OWNERSHIP AND USE IN THE UNITED STAT.S
(1939) 6. Though there are group variations depending upon urban or non-urban resi-
dence, sex, and income, estimates indicate that 60-70% of all radio owners listen regu-
larly to radio news. See LAZERSFELD, RADIO AND THE PRINTED PAGE (1940) 231. Per-
haps the spoken word has a greater power to influence opinion than the written. See
Wilke, An Experimental Comparison of the Speech, the Radio, and the Printed Page
as Propaganda Dzevices (1934) 25 AacHvWs o" PsyCHoLoGY.
84. On December 31, 1941, the Anti-Trust Division brought two cil suits, one
against NBC and one against CBS, charging that these companies monopolized networ:
broadcasting. N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1942, p. 23, col. 2. The relief requested substantially
amounts to judicial imposition of the FCC's chain broadcasting regulations, except in
relation to divestment of network properties. Whereas Section 3.107 of the chain broad-
casting regulations, ordering NBC to sell one of its two networks, was indefinitely
suspended to permit orderly disposition of property, and Section 3.105, ordering sale
of certain network owned stations, had a time extension provision, the complaints in
the anti-trust suits request that the property in question be placed in the hands of a
receiver for sale. Aside from the financial effect upon the two network companies
the same result will be attained by Government victory in either the netwvork suit against
the FCC or the Anti-Trust Division's suits against the network companies.
Intervention of the Anti-Trust Division to secure enforcement of the FCC's regula-
tions emphasizes the ambiguity of the present bases of governmental control over radio
networks. A new statute giving the FCC definite regulatory power would eliminate
the need of such a back door approach to the problem. It is believed that the new
statute should make the FCC's regulatory power exclusive.
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-66 (Supp. 1939) (hereafter cited by
section number only).
2. Section 9(c).
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stresses the importance of protecting contractual rights. Moreover, if power
to certify is held paramount, there looms the more delicate question of the
effect of such action on the continued operation of the existing contract.
Refusal to bargain with the newly certified union will subject the employer
to an unfair labor practice proceeding; obedience to the administrative man-
date may lay him open to a suit on the contract by the displaced repre-
sentative. 3 And the problems are accentuated if the contract in question
provides for a closed shop in favor of the original union. Certification of
a new representative, requiring termination of previous discrimination against
employment of its members, would present a critical reversal of relation,
among employees, their unions and their employer.
As solutions for these problems by the Board or in the courts, three
general possibilities are apparent. First, the existence of a valid contract
negotiated by the majority representative might be held to eliminate all
question as to representation during its term. On the other hand, the con-
tract might be set aside completely on certification of a new bargaining repre-
sentative. Finally, the conflict could be compromised by recognizing the
change in employee allegiance but maintaining the contract binding on em-
ployer and employees, either automatically or at the option of the employer.
Under the compromise theory, a change of representative would alter an
existing contract only by "substituting" the new union for the old tinder its
substantive terms. The choice among these alternatives has become a burning
issue in the development of labor law.
THE POSITION OF THE NLRB
Power to Certify.4 In cases where no contract is involved, the Board has
adopted the policy of postponing a change of representative for a reasonable
period, usually about a year, after a certification.5 But this policy of post-
ponement, based on a rebuttable presumption of the original union's con-
tinuing majority, has been subject to exception on the production of con-
clusive evidence of an unusually large shift.0 Firmly maintaining the primary
3. For the further possibility of a suit by the original union against the new rep-
resentative for inducing breach of contract, see GALENSON, RIVAL UNIONISM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1940) 63 et seq.
4. See generally GALENSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 257-66; ROSENFARD, THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR POLICY (1940) 263-78, 315; 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING (1940) §§333-38; Rice, The Determination of Employee Representalives
(1938) 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 188, 193-200; Rice, The Legal Sigiicance of Labor
Contracts under the National Labor Relations Act (1939) 37 MICH. L. REv. 693. For
the Board's own analysis of its cases on this issue, see its annual reports since 1937.
5. See, e.g., U. S. Stamping Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 172 (1938); General Motors Corp.,
24 N. L. R. B. No. 66, June 22, 1940; cf. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 N. L. R. 13.
42 (1940).
6. New York and Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 595 (1937); Novelty Slipper
Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 264 (1938); Moulton Ladder Manufacturing Co., 31 N. L. R. B. No.
108, May 8, 1941.
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policy of the statute, the Board has refused to limit its discretion in recog-
nizing majority desires as to representation.
When a change in majority allegiance to a particular union appears during
the life of a contract, the Board has been similarly reluctant to announce
inflexible rules as to the scope of its authority. In no case, however, has
certification been denied solely on the ground of the existence of an agree-
ment after the initial year. Although generalization is made difficult by
the great variety of factual situations presented and by changes in Board
personnel, it is clear that the Board has consistently adhered to the policy
that the power to certify cannot be divested by the existence of a contract.
Contracts found illegal because executed or renewed in violation of the
terms of the Act are disregarded as a matter of course. Thus, an agreement
with a minority union (if a majority exists), or with a union under em-
ployer domination or favoritism, cannot bar Board investigation.7 A similar
illegality attaches if the true majority status of the union was doubtful at
the time of the formation or renewal of the agreement. Pendency of a Board
proceeding involving union standing,8 or presentation to the employer of a
formal claim of majority by the rival union,9 puts the employer on notice
of a dispute as to representation, and no agreement negotiated during
the dispute deters the Board from certifying. Where circumstances warrant,
moreover, the employer may be held to constructive notice of a dispute which
has received no formal recognition.10
In cases involving contracts admittedly valid, the Board must proceed
with more caution. Recognition of the difficulty of the problem is implicit
in the Board's alertness to avoid, whenever possible, a determination of the
contract's effect on its power to certify. An agreement in terms conditional on
the continuance of the contracting union's majority can of course not be
7. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261 (193); Inter-
national Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 72 (1940).
S. California Wool Scouring Co., 5 N. L. R. B. 72 (1938) (even though the
employees later ratified the contract) ; Silvray Lighting Inc., 18 N. L. R. B. 719 (1939) ;
Malden Electric Co., 33 N. L. R. B. No. 16, June 30, 1941 (petition filed after the par-
ties had agreed on terms, but before the signing, of the contract). But cf. Superior
Electrical Products Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 19 (1938).
9. National Electric Products Corp., 3 N. L. R. B. 475 (1937), (1938) 47 Y.-
L. J. 799 (despite a court decree of specific performance of the contract by the em-
ployer); Colonie Fibre Co., Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 65S (1938); Ford 'Motor Co., 35 N. L.
R. B. No. 199, Sept. 30, 1941, N. Y. Times, Oct. 15. 1941, p. 1, col. 4. But cf. Hettricl
Manufacturing Co., 25 N. L. R. B. No. 79, July 19, 1940 (postponing election until near
end of a one-year contract, since it was for a reasonable period and was entered vith
the support of the majority).
10. Borg-Warner Corp., 19 N. L. R. B. 538 (1940); General Electric Co., 29 N. L.
R. B. No. 29, Jan. 23, 1941; Garod Radio Corp., 32 N. L. R. B. No. 163, June 23, 1941
(contract formed with union which got same number of votes in election as petitioning
union). But cf. National Sugar Refining Co., 10 N. L. R. B. 1410 (1939).
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pleaded in bar.1 And when a contract is terminable on notice,12 or is near
the end of its term'13 or of the period within which notice of termination may
be given,' 4 the Board proceeds to order an election without determining the
effect of the contract. A newly certified representative may concededly
bargain for a new agreement to take effect on the expiration of the old one,
and it is apparently assumed that the new representative may take advantage
of termination clauses in the existing contract. In the case of a contract for
one year, however, the Board will temporarily deny certification, indulging
the presumption of a continuing majority with more force than in the
simple case of a previous certification.'5
But when a valid contract covering all employees has run for more than
a year and will not, by its terms, terminate for a year or more in the future,
the Board has been compelled to meet the issue. Despite the Board's doubt
of its authority, implied by previous avoidance of the problem, it has in such
cases unequivocally maintained its duty to certify. The Metro-Goldwyn-
11. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 372 (1939) ; Tennessee Copper Co.,
25 N. L. R. B. No. 22, July 6, 1940.
12. Todd-Johnson Dry Docks Inc., 10 N. L. R. B. 629 (1938); Phelps Dodge Cop-
per Products Corp., 29 N. L. R. B. No. 140, Feb. 20, 1941 (following strike by members
of petitioning union, existing contract modified to provide for termination on notice);
General Motors Corp., 32 N. L. R. B. No. 51, June 2, 1941. This is particularly true
where the contracting union has ceased to function. Sound Timber Co., 8 N. L. R. B.
844 (1938); Fischer Lumber Co., Inc., 31 N. L. R. B. No. 136, May 13, 1941.
13. Martin Bros. Box Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 88 (1938); Brown-Saltman Furniture
Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 1174 (1938) ; 1. Miller & Sons, Inc., 13 N. L. R. B. 691 (1939).
14. Utica Knitting Co., 8 N. L. R. B. 783 (1938); Heldman-Schild-Lasser, Inc.,
11 N. L. R. B. 1289 (1939). See Gowanus Towing Co., Inc., 8 N. L. R. B. 820, 824 (1938)
(one-year contract for a preferential shop).
15. See especially Pacific Greyhound Lines,22 N. L. R. B. 111, 131, n. 57 (1940). This
practice has been followed with considerable regularity. See Superior Electrical Products
Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 19 (1938); J. E. Pearce Contracting and Stevedoring Co., Inc., 20
N. L. R. B. 1061 (1940) ; Lewis Bolt and Nut Co., 23 N. L. R. B. 708 (1940). Adherence
to the one-year rule by the present Board (Chairman Millis, Members Leiserson and
Reilly) is indicated by Pressed Steel Car Co., Inc., 36 N. L. R. B. No. 117, Oct. 31,
1941 (despite doubling of number of employees since execution of contract). But c.
Food Machinery Corp., 36 N. L. R. B. No. 98, Oct. 30, 1941 (election ordered after
closed shop contract had run only six months where original union had become inactive).
Difference of opinion among the members of the Board has been particularly appar-
ent in cases where an existing one-year contract has been extended for another year. A
petition for election filed during the extension period will usually be postponed in the
absence of sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the original union maintained
its majority through the first year. See National Sugar Refining Co., 10 N. L. R. B.
1410 (1939); American Hair & Felt Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 572 (1939) ; Utica Knitting
Co., 23 N. L. R. B. 55 (1940); Hettrick Manufacturing Co., 25 N. L. R. B. No. 79,
July 19, 1940; Eaton Manufacturing Co., 29 N. L. R. B. No. 12, Jan. 16, 1941. But cf.
Radio Wire Television, Inc., 30 N. L. R. B. No. 131, April 4, 1941 (evidence of a shift
was conclusive).
[Vol. 51 : 465468
1942] CHANGE OF BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE 469
M11ayer case,'6 for example, involved a collective agreement for five years.
In granting a petition for election filed after the agreement had run one
year, the Board dismissed defenses based on the contract with a simple
reiteration of its belief that employees' choice of bargaining representative
could not be shackled for an unduly long period merely by the existence of
a contract. Similar statements have accompanied similar holdings in several
more recent cases,17 or have been offered as alternative support in cases
where another more settled ground for the decision has been present' 39
The fact that a contract has a long unexpired term, or has no termination
date,' 9 is regarded only as increasing the necessity for an election. Similarly,
the presence of a closed or preferential shop clause in an existing agreement,
because it tends to freeze the status of the present representative and to
make employees reluctant openly to announce their change of union member-
ship, induces additional solicitude in ascertaining current employee senti-
ment..20 Although contract arguments against administrative interference in
such a situation are particularly persuasive,'- 1 they have not induced the
Board to make an exception to its general policy in favor of certification.2
In all situations, therefore, the Board allows a different union to assume
all the rights of the statutory bargaining representative for all the employees.
16. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N. L. R. B. 662, 697 (1938). See also Hu-
binger Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 428 (1937).
17. M1. & J. Tracy, Inc., 12 N. L. R. B. 936 (1939); Volupte, Inc., 22 N. L. R. B.
1029 (1940); Rosedale Knitting Co., 23 N. L. R. B. 527 (1940); Levis Steel Products
Corp., 23 N. L. R. B. 793 (1940) ; Kahn & Feldman, Inc., 30 N. L. R. B. .No. 45, March
13, 1941; Presto Recording Corp., 34 N. L. R. B. No. 3, Aug. 8, 1941.
18. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 8 N. L. R. B. 503 (1938); Colonic Fibre
Co., Inc., 9 N. L. R. B. 658 (1938) ; Showers Brothers Co., Inc., 13 N. L. R. B. 829 (1939) ;
American Hair & Felt Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 570 (1940); Gulf Refining Co., 21 N. L
R. B. 1033 (1940).
19. Seiss Manufacturing Co., 7 N. L. R. B. 481 (1938); Standard Steel Spring
Co., 18 N. L. R. B. 713 (1939).
20. The Board has recognized this in requiring less proof of majority in granting
elections on the petition of outside unions in some such cases. George AV. Borg Corp.,
25 N. L. R. B. No. 58, July 16, 1940; Belmont Radio Corp., .7 N. L. R. B. No. 7S,
Sept. 20, 1940; Oregon Plywood Co., 33 N. L. R. B. No. 206, Aug. 7, 1941. On the
other hand, the possibility of similar coercion was not considered significant in Hetrich:
Manufacturing Co., 25 N. L. R. B. No. 79, July 19, 1940, or Beaunit Mills, Inc., 33 N. L.
R. B. No. 45, July 8, 1941.
21. See opinion of Chairman 'Madden in Ansley Radio Corp., 18 N. L I. B. 102S,
1058 (1939) ; J. E. Pearce Contracting and Stevedoring Co., 20 N. L. R. B. 1061 (1940) ;
S. E. & M. Vernon Inc., 24 N. L. R. B. No. 75, June 15, 1940; Douglas and Lomason
Co., 34 N. L. R. B. No. 8, Aug. 9, 1941. Edwin Smith dissents in each of these cases.
See also concurring opinion of Leserson in Presto Recording Corp., 34 N. L. R. B. No.
3, Aug. 8, 1941, at 6.
22. See Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N. L. R. B. 111, 131, n. 57 (1940). Closed
shop contracts were involved in the following cases in which elections wvere ordered:
2M. & J. Tracy Inc., 12 N. L. R. B. 936 (1939); Borg-Warner Corp., 19 N. L It B.
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Effect of Change of Representative on the Existing Contract. When certi-
fication is granted during the life of an agreement, the Board manifests
justifiable reluctance to commit itself on the effect of its action. Since it is
not charged with the enforcement of contracts the Board feels no duty to
promulgate rules concerning them.28 But the conflict implicit in the situation
is so clear that the Board has recognized the necessity for some solution.
While it is apparent that the Board will not allow the existence of an
agreement to preclude all change, on the other hand it has not suggested
absolute abrogation of the contract. Either doubt as to its authority24 or
respect for whatever rights may have been secured by the contract2 6 has
apparently led the Board to support the "substitutionary" doctrine.
In cases where a change in national affiliation has been accomplished by
a union local acting as a body, Board insistence on substitution is clear.20
Much more usual, however, is a shift in union membership by a simple
majority of employees acting as individuals. In an early case on such facts,27
the Board referred with approval to the substitutionary theory as mitigating
the severity of its refusal to be precluded by the existing contract. Though
this statement was affirmed in its early annual reports, 28 the Board's official
position in the case law has again become doubtful; a policy of substitution
has been consistently advocated only in separate opinions by former Member
Edwin Smith,20 other members for the most part remaining conspicuously
538 (1940); National Battery Co., 28 N. L. R. B. No. 128, Dec. 31, 1940. Existence
of an injunction, ordering the employer to hire only members of the contracting union,
has not deterred the Board from ordering an election, though the contract is valid.
Transformer Corp. of America, 26 N. L. R. B. No. 44, Aug. 10, 1940; Presto Record-
ing Corp., 34 N. L. R. B. No. 3, Aug. 8, 1941.
23. See concurring opinion of Leiserson in Presto Recording Corp., 34 N. L. R. 13.
No. 3, Aug. 8, 1941, at 6.
24. See ibid.
25. See cases cited supra note 21.
26. M. and M. Wood Working Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 372 (1938); Smith Wood Pro-
ducts, Inc., 7 N.L.R.B. 950 (1938); Transformer Corp. of America, 26 N.L.R.B.
No. 44, Aug. 10, 1940. But cf. Douglas and Lomason Co., 34 N. L. R. B. No. 8, Aug.
9, 1941.
27. New England Transportation Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 130 (1936). "The whole pro-
cess of collective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the free-
dom of employees to change their representatives, while at the same time continuing the
existing agreements under which the representatives must function." Id. at 138.
28. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. (1936) 108; 2 id. (1937) at 118. It is noticeable, -however,
that no mention is made of substitution in subsequent annual reports of the Board.
29. Dissenting in National Sugar Refining Co., 10 N. L. R. B. 1410, 1415 (1939);
dissenting in American Hair & Felt Co., 15 N. L. R. B. 572, 579 (1939); concurring in
Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N. L. R. B. 111, 144 (1940); separate opinion, for the
Board, in Utica Knitting Co., 23 N. L. R. B. 55, 60 (1940); concurring in Detroit &
Cleveland Navigation Co., 29 N. L. R. B. No. 33, Jan. 24, 1941, at 6; dissenting itt
Douglas and Lomason Co., 34 N. L. R. B. No. 8, Aug. 9, 1941, at 7.
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silent. Proponents of this compromise device, moreover, admit that even
it is inadequate to sustain the continuance of closed shop clauses.30
Justification for the Board's Position. Writers on the subject, assuming
legislative enactment of the ideal norm of industrial government, have hastened
to offer theoretical support for the Board's assertion of administrative
authority over collective labor agreements. They emphasize that the primary
purpose of the Wagner Act is to insure democratic majority control of the
relations of workers with their employer.31 The position of a national union
organization is considered that of a purely incidental conduit for the free
expression of employee will. It follows that a union losing majority sup-
port simultaneously loses authority to bargain for the employees. From this
point of view, considerations of industrial stability, while important in the
administration of the statute, cannot justify sterilization for an unreasonable
term of the workers' right to continuously accurate representation. More-
over, any contractual attempt to compel employee submission to representa-
tion no longer supported by the majority would be a certain cause of
industrial unrest. These conclusions are allegedly implicit in the statutory
command and cannot be circumvented by private contractual arrangements.P2
Apart from the requirements of the statute, it has been further pointed
out that contract arguments fail to offer a conclusive defense to Board inter-
vention. It was largely by mechanical assumption that labor agreements
were originally assimilated into the contract category.P Traditional indi-
vidualistic contract doctrine has proved inadequate when applied to agree-
ments essentially collective and governmental. Their social and industrial
importance 34 is inconsistent with the restriction of their benefits to the
30. For Smith's opinion that such clauses must become inoperative on the change
of representative, see Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N. L. R. B. 111, 144 (1940), vhich
contains his most complete statement of the effects of substitution, and his opinion in
Ansley Radio Corp., IS N. L. R. B. 1028, 1066 (1939).
31. For discussion of the adoption and the application of the principle of majority
rule, see ROSENFARB, TnE NATIONAL LA0R POLICY (1940) c. IX; Latham, Legislat ,c
Purpose and Administrative Policy under the National Labor Relations Act (1936) 4
Gro. WAsH. L. Rsv. 433, 449.
32. See, e.g., Amendments to the TVagner Act: 11 (1939) 7 INT. Junw. Ass'n BuI,.
85, 94.
33. For the development of the labor agreement, through the status of mere "usage"
or "gentlemen's agreement," to a modified legal enforceability, see 1 TLrLn, LAuo. Dls-
PUTES AND CoLLwrivE BARGAINING (1940) §§ 154-68; Witmer, Coilctihc Labor Agree-
ments in the Courts (1938) 48 YAtz L. J. 195; Pipin, Enforcement of Rights under
Collective Bargaining Agreements (1939) 6 U. oF CHL L. RIy. 651; Rice, Collective
Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HAM. L. Rnv. 572, 581.
34. For a closed shop contract held valid even though the same union held such
contracts covering 95% of the employees in the industry in the region, see F. F. East
Co., Inc. v. United Oystermen's Union 19600, 21 A. (2d) 799 (N. J. Ct. Errors and
App. 1941).
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immediate parties. Straightforward recognition of their quasi-legislative char-
acter, it is argued, 5 would clear the way for a more realistic approach.
Even conceding that collective agreements should be warped into ordinary
contract moulds, traditional doctrine, expanded to meet the requirements
of a new legal form, may be invoked to justify the Board's position. Under
third party beneficiary doctrine, usually cited in opposition to the Board,
employees could be held entitled to disclaim the benefits of the contract30
Since, however, this rationale is postulated on a controlling and independent
position for the union, its validity under the Wagner Act is questionable.
Recognition of an independent legal right in the union no longer has the
support which it mustered when agreements could be negotiated irrespective
of questions of majority representation. The theory customarily invoked,
therefore, is that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the
statute, is the true party in interest to the contract, holding rights through
the agency of the union representative.31 Thus any exclusive interest claimed
by the agent is defeasible at the will of the principal. And since the principal
remains the same after an election to shift agents, "substitution" can be
justified as effecting no material change in the legal rights or obligations
of the majority entity.8
THE POSITION OF THE COURTS
Attack on the Board's Conclusions. In the courts and before Congress, 0
employers and contract-holding unions have urged considerations directly
opposed to those adopted by the Board. They have relied on the Act's
emphasis on the necessity for elimination of the recurrent disruptions in
35. TELLER, op. cit. supra note 33, at §§ 172-77; Witmer, supra note 33, at 195-99,
221; Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts (1918) 27 YALE L. 3. 753.
This has been largely accomplished in some foreign countries. See in ra note 85.
36. See REsTATEmENT, CONMACTS (1932) § 137. This argument, however, has not
been adopted, since it neglects the concurrent benefits to both union and employer under
the contract.
37. See, e.g., Larson, The Labor Relations Acts-Their Effect on Industrial War-
fare (1938) 36 MIcr. L. Ray. 1237, 1254.
38. See Note (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1059, 1064; cf. National Fed. Ry. Workers v.
NMB, 110 F. (2d) 529, 532 (App. D. C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 628 (1940):
"The fact that employees have amicable relations with their employers does not, how-
ever, preclude the existence of a dispute inter se as to the representative for collective
bargaining purposes!'
39. In the turbulent controversy which arose in 1938 around the Act and its admin-
istration, several amendments were proposed specifically restricting the authority of the
Board. One of these, the Walsh bill [S. 1000, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939)], was intro-
duced on behalf of the AFL. It contained [§ 10(e)] a declaration that the union has
an interest in its own right in the contract, and that a change of affiliation by the
employees should not affect the rights of the union until one year after the execution
of the contract. See Amendments to the Wagner Act (1939) 7 INT. JURiD. Ass'n BULL.
73, 85; Legis. (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 970, 978.
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industrial relations.40 In enforcing negotiation by employers the statute re-
quires willingness to put the results into legally enforceable form.41 Xo
maximum is set for the term of the contract, and closed shop agreements
are specifically not prohibited. The contract culminating the statutory bar-
gaining process must, to be effective, be binding on both parties. The em-
ployee, it is argued, deliberately agrees to a limitation on his right to change
representative, in return for the benefits of participation in the agreement
negotiated by the union. 43
The facts of union organization and labor relations, moreover, are invoked
to deny the power claimed by the Board. In the typical situation the hbor
agreement is conceived and negotiated by officials of the central union
organization, supported in their demands by a bargaining strength far greater
than that of the particular local union.44 The employer, correspondingly,
must measure his concessions by the bargaining strength and the reliability
of the union with which he is negotiating. A decisive alteration in his position
would follow the "substitution" of a new part), entitled to enforce the con-
tract against him.4 5 On the other hand, it is said that the interest of the
union in the contract should not be limited to the interest of the single unit
covered by it. As a source of strength in industry as a whole, the contract
is of vital importance to the union organization and all its members. Par-
ticularly in the case of a closed or preferential shop provision, the contract
has the immediate value of possible future livelihood to other union mem-
bers in the locality 4 6
These facts gain significance, according to opponents of the Board, in the
application of contract law to the controversy. Despite the decree of the
statute that bargaining is legitimate only, if done by the representative of
40. Section 1; see Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 236 (1939).
41. -L J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1941), aff'g 110 F. (2d) 843 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1940), enf'g 10 N. L. R. B. 963 (1939). On the extent of this requirement, see
Daykin, Social and Legal Implications of Collective Bargaining ander 11h NLR1 (1941)
21 B. U. L. Rav. 212, 2727 ct seq.
42. Section 8(3).
43. de Vyver, The Intra-Union Control of Collecli'e Bargaining (1938) 5 L.%w &
Co-xvN-mT. PRoB. 288, 294.
44. Id. at 299 and passim.
45. "These [new] representatives are of course free to bargain cancerning changes
in the existing arrangements . . ." New England Transportation Co., 1 N. L RL B. 130,
139 (1936), cited supra note 27. But under the Norris-La Guardia Act, existence of a
valid contract will not ground an injunction against striking or picketing in support of
demands contrary to terms of the contract. 47 STATT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101
(1934) ; Fur Workers Union, Local No. 172 v. Fur Workers Union, 105 F. (2d) 1 (App.
D. C. 1939); Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn. 1937).
46. See 3 Excvc. Soc. Scic zCs 568, 570; cf. Pa. Lab. Red. Bd. v. Red Star Shc2
Repairing Co., Inc., 1 C. C. IL Labor Cases 66 , (69 (Pa. C. P. 1938); Mason Manu-
facturing Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, Local No. 576, 2 L.%u. r. REP.
838 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938).
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the majority, the union is entitled to claim definite interests in its own right
under a contract. Conclusions drawn from the principal-agent theory of col-
lective agreements are therefore rejected as unrealistic. The majority entity
of the employees should allegedly be regarded rather as a passive third party
beneficiary of the contract negotiated by the union.47 Under this rationale,
one group of employees may not elect to terminate the rights and liabilities
of the principal parties after accepting the benefits of the contract. Substi-
tution can be justified only under principles of novation, which require
consent by the employer or by both original parties.48 To make an employer's
rights dependent on the will of his employees, moreover, violates a funda-
mental contract requirement which the statute cannot be invoked to eliminate.4,
Judicial Attitude toward Substitution. The courts have tended to accept
these arguments in preference to those supporting the Board. Although final
judicial pronouncement until recently has been lacking, 0 it has been gener-
ally apparent that a labor agreement would be strictly enforced as creating
property rights in the union whose name appears on the contract instrument.51
The specific terms and the "intent of the parties" have been examined for
indications of the party in interest.52 If the contract has been found to run
to a national or to a local union embracing more than the particular unit
covered by it, it is necessarily immune from repudiation by a mere majority
of the employees in that unit.5
3
Even in the rare case of a contract held by a one-unit local, moreover, a
change in representative is not allowed to affect the terms of the agreement.
It has been held that a local may, by a technically perfect transfer of national
affiliation, continue to exercise contract rights acquired while tinder the
former affiliation.54 But the obstacles to complete secession and reaffiliation
are almost insuperable, even admitting compliance with the constitution or
47. A majority of the courts have adopted this legal theory in their treatment of
collective agreements. See 1 TELLER, LABOR DiSPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BAROAINING
(1940) §§ 167, 168; Mason Manufacturing Co. v. United Furniture Workers of Amer-
ica, Local No. 576, 2 LAB. REL. REP. 838 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1938).
48. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 430.
49. For the employer's practical reaction to the situation, see RiNcKxOF AND
RECTOR, PROCEDURE AND PRAcricE UNDER THE NLRA (1940) 96, stating that an exist-
ing contract will become void if another union is certified.
50. The delay is attributable to the fact that there is no appeal from a certification
or an order for an election by the Board. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401 (1940) ; NLRB
v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453 (1940).
51. See Note (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1059, 1060; (1940) 3& Mcu. L. REv. 516, 519.
52. M and M Wood Working Co. v. NLRB, 101 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939),
48 YALE L. J. 1059, setting aside 6 N. L. R. B. 372 (1938), cited supra note 26; United
Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1320. The' vagueness of the criteria for this determination is illustrated by the Wood-
workers case.
53. See cases cited supra notes 47 and 52.
54. See Note (1939) 48 YA.E L. J. 1059, 1061, n. 17 and cases cited.
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charter of the national union. A finding that the local has been disbanded
and recreated may mean the termination of its rights;5 on the other hand,
a small group remaining in the original affiliation may retain all rights of
the local.5 G It follows that a transfer of union support by the simple majority
sufficient for Board certification cannot, at least in current judicial atmos-
phere, divest the original representative of its rights under an agreement
with the employer.
Judicial Attitude toward Abrogation. In the light of the limitations im-
posed on the possibility of substitution, it is natural for the courts to resist
administrative attempts to set aside a contract on the certification uf a new
representative. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in the
recent Electric Vacuum Cleaner Companly casey7 has left little doubt of its
opposition to the Board. Here, an AFL local held a wage contract for one
year. An oral agreement for a preferential shop had accompanied the con-
tract, but had not been posted with it nor read in union meetings. Shortly
after renewal of the contract a CIO movement began. Following a CIO
strike protesting the discharge of an employee for refusing to join the AFL,
the plant was closed at the request of the AFL. During the shut-down the
CIO local made a formal claim of majority and filed a petition for election
with the Board. Later the company executed a dosed shop contract with
the AFL and re-opened, hiring only AFL men. A great majority of the em-
ployees then returned to work as AFL members.
On these facts the Board ordered the employer to cease giving effect to
the dosed shop contract and directed that an election be held, offering
familiar grounds for its decision.5 Having no notice of the purported prefer-
ential shop agreement, the men were held wrongly discharged for failing
to support the AFL.5" Since the acts of employer assistance to the AFL
were illegal, and since there had been previous notice of a dispute as to
representation, the subsequent dosed shop contract was declared invalid.
The Sixth Circuit, however, denied the Board's petition for enforcement
of the order against the employer. The company's assistance was justified
on the ground that notice of the preferential shop agreement to officers of
55. See, e.g., Matter of Klinger v. Krum, Inc., 259 App. Div. 309, 19 N. Y. S. (2d)
193 (1st Dep't 1940).
56. For even stronger judicial opinion against substitution, see I and 11 NVco
Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local No. 102, 23 F. Supp 11, (D. Ore.
1938), in which the court states that its decision would be the Eame even if the shift had
been unanimous. This case also contains the suggestion that the original affiliation could
not be ended in any case without consent of the parent.
57. NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc., 120 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 6th,
1941), cert. granted, 10 U. S. L. Wnr, 3129 (U. S. 1941).
58. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., Inc., 8 N. L. R. B. 112 (1938).
59. The Board held further that in no event could a preferential _hup cuntract
justify many of the acts of the company. 8 N. L. R. B. 112, 118 (1938). It is to review
the Circuit Court's reversal on this point that certiorari has been granted.
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the union local constituted notice to all the members. Because the original
contract was in effect and the employees had not withdrawn their AFL
authorizations, it was held that the AFL was still the representative at the
formation of the closed shop contract, and that contract was therefore valid.
The court noted, however, that the original contract was for a reasonable
term, and that no other bargaining representative had been certified.00
Implications of the possibility of an approach more favorable to the Board's
position are contained in the recent McKesson & Robbins case. 1 Sustaining
the Board's conclusion that an intra-AFL truce agreement did not preclude
certification after one of the conflicting AFL unions removed to the CIO,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held invalid a closed shop
contract with the remaining AFL union executed during the dispute.
02
The current conflict on the issues involved in the general problem is illus-
trated in Klein v. Herrick,13 in which the District Court for the Southern
District of New York refused to enjoin an election ordered during the term
of a closed shop contract. The court assumed jurisdiction on the theory
that the possibility of a newly certified union negotiating changes in the
existing contract created a danger of legal injury, 4 but denied relief on the
60. 120 F. (2d) 611, 615-16 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). The reasoning of the court is
typical: "The express purpose of the statute was the establishment of industrial peace,
and the [closed shop] proviso was enacted to give the employer the opportunity of deal-
ing in an orderly fashion with one organization only, instead of with various conflicting
organizations. . . . The Congress would not have specifically authorized a contract of
this nature unless it had intended that both parties should be bound thereby. . . . If
the one-year term limits the freedom of the employees at will to discard membership in
one union for membership in another, the limitation has been freely agreed to by the
men themselves . . ." For very similar treatment of the problem, see Peninsular &
Occidental S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), cert. denied, 305
U. S. 653 (1938), setting aside 5 N. L. R. B. 959 (1938).
61. NLRB v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 121 F. (2d) 84 (App. D. C. 1941), 28 VA.
L. REv. 100, cert. denied, 10 U. S. L. WEEx 3138 (U. S. 1941), enjg McKesson & Rob-
bins, Inc., 5 N. L. R. B. 70 (1938).
62. Though this decision is based on construction of the terms of the truce agree-
ment itself, the court intimates that it would have reached a similar decision regardless
of the intent of the agreement: "It did not purport to bind the unions as such not to
change affiliation. But even if it had done this, that would be very different from bind-
ing the individual members likewise to retain affiliation." 121 F. (2d) 84, 92 (App.
D. C. 1941).
63. 41 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. N.Y. 1941). This was an application by the AFL union
holding the existing closed shop contract which the Board had disregarded in Presto
Recording Corp., 34 N. L. R. B. No. 3, Aug. 8, 1941, cited supra note 17.
64. 41 F. Supp. at 419-23. Citing AFL v. M111adden [33 F. Supp. 943 (D. D. C. 1940)]
and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB [41 F. Supp. 57 (E. D.
Mich. 1940)), the court held that an injunction might be available against a wrongful
election order by the Board- even though no appeal from the order could be had. In
neither of these cases, however, was the injunction predicated on the existence of a
contract; the Board orders complained of had totally excluded the petitioning unions
from the ballot. For a case refusing to base an injunction on the existence of a contract,
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ground that the damage anticipated in the particular situation was too remote
and uncertain. Reserving decision on the effect of certification of the rival
union, the court noted that the contract might continue specifically enforce-
able regardless of the outcome of the election, but suggested the possibility
of substitution "with the consent of the employer," on the basis of the agency
theory of union representation. 0  'Xhile the federal courts have thus skirted
the periphery of the main problem, the New York courts have met it head-on.
One lower state court has produced a definitive denial of such authority in
the National Board. In Labarge v. Malone Annintuim Corporaioi, 0 where
the Board had certified one union during the life of a contract in favor of
another, the employer had then entered into a contract with the new repre-
sentative. At the instance of the first union, performance of the second con-
tract was enjoined.
The most authoritative and the most definite opposition to the Board's
position has emerged in the recent Triboro Coach Corporalion decision by
the New York Court of Appeals.07 The controversy arose between two
rival unions under the state Labor Relations Act. 9 Amalgamated Associa-
tion, an AFL local, held a closed shop contract for three years,c3 renewable
automatically in the absence of notice of termination ninety days before the
end of its term. After this agreement had run one year, CIO's Transport
Workers Union conducted a membership drive, and petitioned the Board
for an election of representative by employees. The Board first granted the
petition, but on rehearing denied it, making an exception to established prac-
tice solely on the ground that the contract in question was executed before
see Amalgamated feat Cutters & Butchers Workmen of North America v. Sprechels,
119 F. (2d) 64 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941).
65. 41 F. Supp. at 424. The interesting suggestion is added that the Board's action
"may revreal but not create" the fact of a shift.
66. 3 C. C. H. LABOR CASES 60,057, 6 L.B. REL. RE. 8Q7 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).
"The Act does not confer upon the Labor Board authority to invalidate contract,; with
independent labor organizations. . . . The initial contract in question, between members
of a union and their employer, established property rights which the courts, if possible,
should protect and should not surrender to a Board whose authority to invalidate them
has not been specifically given." Id. at 60,058, 6 LAD. REL. RE'. at 883.
67. Triboro Coach Corp. v. NYSLRB, 286 N. Y. 314, 36 N. E. (2d) 315 (1941)
(Lehman, Loughran and Desmond dissenting), 90 U. OF Pi. L. rEv. 225. Motion fi#r
rehearing was filed Oct. 11, 1941. On the lower court opinion, see (1941) 41 CoL. L.
Rxv. 524.
68. N. Y. LAB.oR LAW §§ 700-16. The right to bargaining representatives of the
free choice of the employees is also granted by N. Y. Coxsr. (1938) Art. I, § 17. The
New York statute is substantially identical, for present purposes, with the Wagner Act.
The NYSLRB has also developed a certification practice identical with that of the Na-
tional Board. See NYSLRB REP. (1939) 104-17; id. (1940) at 73-0.
69. This contract with Amalgamated, at the time the only labor organizatitn in
the field, had been signed before Triboro had started its omnibus service or had hired
any employees. See 286 N. Y. 314, 329, 36 N. E. (2d) 315, 321 (1941).
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the effective date of the statute.7 0 Toward the end of the period within which
notice of termination might be given, officials of the AFL national began
negotiations for a new contract. On the day the period ended 71 Transport
again sought an election. The Board granted the petition for election 72 but
twice postponed the date for holding it at the request of Amalgamated.
Before that date Amalgamated had concluded another three-year closed shop
contract with the company. Though this contract was ratified by the em-
ployees as members of Amalgamated, a majority voted at the subsequent
election to be represented by Transport. Pleading its AFL contract, how-
ever, the employer refused to bargain with the CIO local.
. On unfair labor practice charges filed by Transport, the Board ordered
Triboro to recognize and bargain with Transport, basing its decision on
three alternative grounds:73 The original contract was found to have been
terminated during the negotiations for the new one. The second contract
was held invalid because it had been executed during the pendency of a
representation proceeding. And in any event, since the employees had never
voted on the question, they could no longer be barred from effectuating their
desires as to representation.
The Court of Appeals, affirming a judgment of the lower court 74 setting
aside the Board's order, specifically denied each of the Board's arguments.
The finding of termination of the first contract was held to be without factual
support. Since the agreement provided for a closed shop, a fortiori it con-
stituted Amalgamated the representative of the employees throughout its
life; nor could this immutable fact be altered by administrative notice of a
representation question. 75 To emphasize its position on the basic issue, the
70. 2 L. R. R. MAN. 566, 567 (1938).
71. It was so treated by the court. Dealing with the deadline for notice of ter-
mination, the contract specified "ninety days" before the end of its term; Transport's
petition, however, was filed three calendar months, in this case 92 days, before the end
of the life of the contract. Thus the petition was actually two days within the period
for notice. It was principally on this ground that rehearing has been asked. See Brief
for NYSLRB on Notice of Motion for Reargument, filed Oct. 11, 1941.
72. 5 L. R. R. MAN. 630 (1939). Some of the members of Transport, in danger of
discharge under the closed shop contract, had sought to enjoin its performance. The suit
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, though the court indicated its belief that Triboro
had been guilty of unfair labor practice. Domanick v. Triboro Coach Corp., 18 N. Y. S.
(2d) 650 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In a second action between the same parties a temporary
injunction was granted pending Board decision, but this was reversed on appeal, 173
Misc. 911, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 960 (Sup. Ct. 1940), reznd, 259 App. Div. 657, 20 N. Y. S.
(2d) 306 (1st Dep't 1940).
73. 6 L. R. R. MAN. 631 (1940).
74. 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 1013 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 636, 27 N. Y. S.
(2d) 83 (2d Dep't 1941).
75. "By waiting until the expiration of the period during which such notice might be
given, the employees have in effect made a choice that Amalgamated is to be their rep-
resentative for the next three years . . ." 286 N. Y. 314, 320, 36 N. E. (2d) 315, 317.
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court addressed itself directly to the question "whether employees who have
made a valid contract with their employer may, while the contract is in force,
choose another union as their representative to repudiate the contract." The
answer was unequivocal that "there is nothing in this right of union members
to select a new bargaining representative which would impair the sanctity
of the obligations of the existing contract . . .,,1(
THE LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM
Limitations on the right of employees to freedom of choice of representa-
tion, clear in the New York courts and discernible in the tenor of federal
decisions, threaten destruction of the fundamental accomplishment claimed for
the Labor Relations Act. If the present judicial attitude prevails, change of
representative will be held ineffective during a valid agreement for whatever
term. But the courts have gone further, challenging the basis of more settled
administrative practice. It appears that a dosed shop contract may be held
by nature conclusive of representation for the purposes of negotiation even
as to the future. In the absence of an officially proven shift, the authority
of te existing formal representative may not be terminated by mere doubt
as to its continuing majority status. Thus an outside union must, to prevent
extension of an existing contract, establish a bargaining position during the
term of the contract. Its difficulties in obtaining and proving a majority are
increased by the employer resistance held permissible under the closed shop
proviso. 77 Since the union contract may be renewed, as in the Triboro case,
against the will of the particular employees, attractive possibilities are offered
for self-perpetuation by an inside union.78
Adoption of a strictly contractual approach to a problem largely political
may be partially justified by the judicial tradition protecting contract rights
of union and employer. On the other hand, it is open to criticism for com-
plete refusal to consider the possibility that those rights have been modified
by the Wagner Act. If a system of employee participation in industrial
relations is desired, it is vital to define the extent to which the majority
voice may be silenced by private contracts. While the existence of a dosed
The court suggested three ways by which the employees might have freed themselves:
either directly or through the officers of Amalgamated they might have given notice of
termination; or they might have instituted a representation proceeding within the periol
for notice. The adequacy of these methods may be questioned in the light of the obvious
split between the employees and Amalgamated, and of the danger attending open reb.-l-
lion by a group of employees under a closed shop contract.
76. 286 N. Y. 314, 318, 322, 36 N. E. (2d) 315, 316, 318 (1941).
77. See note 42 supra. It is on this issue that the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in the Vacuml Cleaners case. See (1941) 10 U. S. L -VUra 31-Z9.
78. See Analysis: Employees' Right to Change Unions Linited by Contract, 8 Lan .
REL. REP. (Supp. to No. 24, Aug. 11, 1941) 4, and a similar adverse reaction to the
Triboro decision in "No Escape for Worker," N. Y. Sun, Aug. 12. 1941, p. 15, cols. 3-4
(David Lawrence).
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or preferential shop contract adds to the doctrinal objections to adminis-
trative action, it also points with additional clarity the need for such action.
Further, although the decisions are rendered in the name of contractual and
industrial stability, the courts themselves have noticed that denial of employee
desires as to representation can be a potent incentive to resort to the strike
weapon.
79
But in the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling, 0 there seems
little likelihood that labor contract procedure in the courts will be brought
into harmony with Board practice.81 Even though desirable solutions of the
problem may eventually develop in the courts, the importance of the issues
justifies more immediate legislative action. Possible forms for amending the
Wagner Act are varied. For example, substitution, rejected by the courts,
may be accomplished by legislative fiat. But the anomalies arising in the
application of a principle of substitution to a closed shop situation illustrate
its inconclusive and makeshift character. In practice it cannot accomplish
the maintenance of contractual stability, which is its theoretical justification.
More satisfactory would be direct enactment of some modification of the
current philosophy of the Board. Official restriction of the life of labor
agreements to a one-year term, coupled with a requirement for annual re-
examination of employee union support, would eliminate existing possibilities
for freezing representation. Correlative enactment of the inviolability of agree-
ments during the one-year period would meet the requirement of reasonable
stability. Agreements for a longer term might be permitted, subject as a
matter of law to termination after an initial protective period on notice or
by a change in representative. There are indications of the political feasi-
bility of the adoption of this method of solution. Followed in practice by
the Board, it is implicit in the amendments proposed by the AFL,8 2 and
79. The court in the Triboro case rejects the Board's methods as putting a pre-
mium on industrial unrest by subjecting the contract to revision once each year. It
acknowledges, however, that refusal to grant the Board its asserted power tends "to
compel the new union to resort to a strike to enforce its demands." But since "the em-
ployer will be free to discharge those workers who are unwilling to be bound by the
contracts," all objections to strikes are apparently dispelled. 286 N. Y. 314, 322, 36 N. E,
(2d) 315, 318 (1941). See "Triboro Coach Ruling Seen as Aid to Stability," N. Y.
Herald Tribune, Aug. 3, 1941, § II, p. 9, col. 6.
80. Although certiorari was granted in the Vacuum Clcancrs case apparently to
examine the extent of employer assistance permissible under a closed shop contract,
there is a possibility that the Supreme Court may decide on the broader question of the
right of the company in any case to enter a contract after notice of a dispute as to rep-
resentation.
81. The rehearing requested in the Triboro case, even if granted, would probably not
result in a reversal of the court's position on change of representative during the life of
a contract. The ground for the motion is an alleged mistake of fact in the court's con-
sideration, and thus applies to the application of the rule laid down by the court, not
to the rule itself.
82. See note 39 supra.
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has the modified support of the CIO. s3 If this proposal proves impractical
or inadequate in protecting freedom of choice of representative, resort may
be had to broader controls. The establishment of a continuously available
governmental administration of collective agreements, for example, would
permit the adjustment of contract rights to changes in representative accord-
ing to the requirements of each case.8 4 Legislative adoption of standard
agreements to cover entire industries with the effect of law,85 a still further
step, would remove the whole problem from control by union contract.
Practical and political objections to these measures, however, re-emphasize
the desirability of confining the methods of solving the problem to presently
available techniques.
83. See RosF-xFARB, THE N.TIONAL LABOR POLIC.Y (1940) 272.
84. This is provided for, as to contracts covering railroad workers, by Sections 2,
3 and 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1185, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-64 (1934).
85. For this procedure in foreign countries, see Hamburger, The Extension of Col-
lective Agreements to Cover Entire Trades and Industries (1939) 40 Iay. LAD. REV. 153;
Legalization of Collective Agreements in Foreign Countries (1936) 43 MONTHLY Ln.
REV. 398.
